Jump to content

Battle of Villers-Bocage

Coordinates: 49°4′50″N 0°39′22″W / 49.08056°N 0.65611°W / 49.08056; -0.65611 (Battle of Villers-Bocage)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by EyeSerene (talk | contribs) at 18:59, 11 December 2009 (→‎Analysis: this bit might be better here). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Template:FixBunching

Battle of Villers-Bocage
Part of Operation Perch
A tank, with debris strewn around it, is in front of a damaged and fire scorched house. The tank is position on the pavement and partially on the road.
Captain Paddy Victory's destroyed Cromwell observation post tank[1]
Date13 June 1944[2]
Location
Villers-Bocage, France[2]
Result Tactically indecisive[3]
Operational German victory[4][5][6]
Belligerents
 United Kingdom  Germany
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom George Erskine[7]
United Kingdom William Hinde[8]		 Nazi Germany Fritz Bayerlein[9]
Nazi Germany Heinz von Westernhagen[10]
Strength

One Brigade group[11][12]

~60 tanks[13]

2 ad-hoc battlegroups[14][15]
Elements of 1 heavy tank battalion[16]

31–41 tanks[nb 1]
Casualties and losses
~217 casualties
23–27 tanksa		 Unknown casualties
8–15 tanksa
aMore detailed information is available in the 'Casualties' section

Template:FixBunching

Template:FixBunching

The Battle of Villers-Bocage took place during the Second World War on 13 June 1944, one week after the Allies landed in Normandy to begin the liberation of German-occupied France. In an opportunistic development of a British operation whose aim was to encircle and seize the city of Caen, a Brigade group of the 7th Armoured Division sought to exploit a gap that appeared in the German defences to the west of the city. The British bypassed the front line and reached the small town of Villers-Bocage, but the Germans had anticipated the thrust and hastily repositioned their reserves to cover their open flank. As the Brigade group's vanguard pushed beyond the town it was ambushed by German heavy tanks, and increasingly strong counterattacks forced the British to abandon Villers-Bocage for a more defensible position. Despite a successful defence of its "Brigade Box" the following day, the Brigade group was withdrawn during the night of 14–15 June after additional German forces were rushed to the area.

During the Battle of Normandy that followed the Allied landings on 6 June (D-Day), Caen was a major British objective. An initial attempt to reach the city on D-Day failed, and the Germans rapidly established strong defences. On 7 June, the British launched Operation Perch, which by 9 June had become a two-pronged attack aimed at surrounding and capturing Caen. However, both arms of the offensive—I Corps on the left and XXX Corps on the right—soon stalled in the face of dogged resistance. I Corps's attack was called off, but on XXX Corps's right flank, American pressure had forced back an exhausted German infantry division and opened a wide gap in the front line. In an effort to keep operations mobile, a mixed force of tanks, infantry and artillery formed around the 7th Armoured Division's 22nd Armoured Brigade was diverted from its contest for Tilly-sur-Seulles with the German Panzer Lehr armoured division and ordered to advance through the gap towards Villers-Bocage. British commanders hoped this flanking manoeuvre would break the deadlock and force the Panzer Lehr Division to fall back.

The 22nd Brigade group entered Villers-Bocage during the morning of 13 June, and its lead elements moved quickly to secure Point 213, a commanding area of high ground to the east. However, the British were caught unawares by Tiger I tanks of the SS Heavy Panzer Battalion 101. In fewer than 15 minutes numerous tanks, anti-tank guns and transport vehicles fell victim to the German force, the vast majority being destroyed by SS-Obersturmführer (Lieutenant) Michael Wittmann's tank. Point 213's defenders were cut off and taken prisoner, and a German attack was launched against the town during the afternoon. Although this ran into an ambush and suffered significant losses, after six hours the British commander decided to withdraw his force to a defensive position outside the town—a move that was accomplished, before nightfall, largely without interference.

Fighting resumed the next day in the Battle of the Brigade Box, following which the decision was taken to pull the Brigade group back from its salient. Villers-Bocage played no further role in the Second Army's Battle for Caen, which was finally liberated on 19 July. A Royal Air Force bombing raid in support of Operation Epsom largely destroyed Villers-Bocage, which eventually fell to the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division on 4 August. Analyses of the battle have generally taken the view that, due to failures at the British divisional and corps command levels, an early opportunity to capture Caen was squandered.

Background

Main article: Operation Perch
A diagram of the Caumont Gap and the advances made by the Anglo-American forces, as described in the text.
Allied and Axis dispositions on 12 June 1944

The Norman city of Caen was a major British objective on 6 June 1944, the day of the Allied invasion of German-occupied France.[20] However, I Corps's 3rd Infantry Division was unable to generate enough momentum to carry its troops from their landing point at Sword beach into the city that day. The division, hampered by the late arrival of its armoured support and forced to divert efforts against strongly-held German positions en route, was stopped short of Caen's outskirts by elements of the 21st Panzer Division.[21] The next day, following their pre-invasion timetable, the British launched Operation Perch. This had been planned before D-Day as an advance to the southeast of Caen, but was heavily reliant on the city's early capture.[22] Foiling British intentions, German resistance rapidly solidified in front of Caen, so on 9 June the Allied ground forces commander, General Bernard Montgomery, altered Perch to incorporate a pincer movement intended to surround and take the city.[23]

After a delay caused by getting units into position, the pincer movement was launched on 12 June.[24] The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, spearheading the thrust that was intended to sweep around the eastern side of Caen, soon ran into difficulty. Stiff resistance from the 21st Panzer Division prevented the Highlanders from making anything more than minor gains, and the next day their attack was called off.[25] Similar problems faced XXX Corps in its drive to the west of Caen. The corps rapidly became bogged down in heavy fighting for the village of Tilly-sur-Seulles, unable to make headway against the newly arrived Panzer Lehr Division—one of the most powerful armoured formations in the German Army.[26][27][28][29] However, on XXX Corps's right flank, a potentially favourable situation was developing. Here the German 352nd Infantry Division had been in combat since its defence of Omaha Beach on D-Day. As American advances, from Omaha Beach, progressed the German division came under pressure from the United States 1st Infantry Division, and having received few replacements for the losses it had suffered, the 352nd began to give way.[30] Five German battle groups, including LXXXXIV Corps's reserves,[31] had been destroyed in the same sector since D-Day, and these losses together with the 352nd's withdrawal created a 7.5-mile (12.1 km) void in the German defences. The opening, near the village of Caumont-l'Éventé at the junction of the United States V Corps and XXX Corps, was dubbed the "Caumont Gap".[31][32]

Conscious of the opportunity thus presented, British Second Army commander Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey met with Lieutenant-General Gerard Bucknall, commanding XXX Corps, and Major-General George Erskine, commanding the 7th Armoured Division. Erskine was ordered to disengage his armour from the fighting around Tilly-sur-Seulles.[33] 7th Armoured was now to exploit the Caumont Gap,[32] seize the town of Villers-Bocage, and advance into the Panzer Lehr Division's exposed flank.[34][35] A ridge 1.6 miles (2.6 km) to the east of Villers-Bocage was the ultimate goal;[36] Dempsey hoped that the appearance of British tanks in Panzer Lehr's rear, occupying high ground and interdicting important lines of communication, would compel the German division to withdraw or surrender and thus keep operations fluid.[7][11][37]

Despite the opportunity, the 7th Armoured Division was slow to redeploy and spent the morning of 12 June attempting to advance on Tilly-sur-Seulles according to its original orders. At 12:00 a meeting was held between Major-General Erskine and Brigadier Hinde, commanding officer of the 22nd Armoured Brigade; Hinde was ordered to move immediately to exploit the gap in the German front line.[7] Soon afterwards the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars, the 7th Armoured Division's armoured reconnaissance regiment,[38] began to reconnoitre the route the brigade would take; the rest of the division departed from the village of Trungy at around 16:00.[39] Four hours later the main body was approaching Livry,[40] after a 12-mile (19 km) unopposed advance, 6 miles (9.7 km) of which were though German-held territory.[35] However, north of Livry the leading Cromwell tanks of the 8th Hussars were destroyed by an anti-tank gun of the Panzer Lehr Division's Escort Company.[39][nb 2] Infantry were brought forward and within two hours the position was cleared.[40]

Hoping to keep the Germans guessing as to the British objective, Brigadier Hinde ordered a halt for the night.[8] While the main force stopped near La Mulotiere and conducted routine maintenance,[39] the 8th and 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars (the division's armoured car regiment[38]) reconnoitred the flanks.[42] The 11th Hussars found no resistance on the right flank and linked up with the US 1st Infantry Division, while on the left flank the 8th Hussars located elements of the Panzer Lehr Division just under 2 miles (3.2 km) away.[42]

Planning

Further information: Battle of Villers-Bocage order of battle
A man, wearing dress uniform and a cap, sits on top of a tank barrel; the tank is not fully in view.
Michael Wittman photographed one month prior to Operation Overlord

During the night, Hinde put the final touches to his battle plan.[11][43] It was clear that to retain control of Villers-Bocage his 22nd Armoured Brigade group would have to occupy the nearby ridge.[36][44] The 4th County of London Yeomanry (4CLY), with one company of the 1st Battalion the Rifle Brigade, was to pass through Villers-Bocage and occupy Point 213, the highest point of the ridge. The 1/7th Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey) would follow up and occupy the town itself, while the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5RTR), with a further company of the Rifle Brigade, was to take up positions on a second area of high ground to the southwest of the town at Maisoncelles-Pelvey.[45] Equipped with M10 Achilles self propelled anti-tank guns,[12] the 260th Anti-tank Battery of the Norfolk Yeomanry would cover the gap between 4CLY and 5RTR.[45] The 5th Royal Horse Artillery, equipped with Sexton self propelled artillery guns, would come after the rest of the brigade. Hinde's two Hussar regiments were to provide flank protection, act as a buffer, screen the British from the Panzer Lehr Division, and seek out enemy positions on either side of the line of advance.[46] The remainder of his force—the 131st Infantry Brigade with the 1st Royal Tank Regiment and the 1/5th and 1/6th battalions Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)[38] — was to position itself in the Livry area to hold a "firm base", keeping the Brigade group's lines of communications secure.[47][48]

Three men conduct maintenance on a tank; the tank is partially obscured by bushes, which its gun barrel protrudes through.
A camouflaged Tiger tank on the Ancuenne Route de Caen, where Wittmann's company spent the night of June 12/13.[49]

For the Germans, command of the high ground near Villers-Bocage was a priority should the British attempt to exploit the Caumont Gap.[50] Well aware of their vulnerability, they planned to close the gap with the 2nd Panzer and 3rd Parachute Divisions.[51] However, these formations would not be in place until 15 June, so light reconnaissance forces were sent to cover the area.[52] In addition, I SS-Panzer Corps commander Sepp Dietrich ordered his only reserve, the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, to position itself behind the Panzer Lehr and 12th SS-Panzer Divisions to screen his open left flank.[53]

The Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 had arrived in Normandy on 12 June, after a five day, 160-mile (260 km) drive from Beauvais.[50][54] Mustering 45 Tiger I tanks at full strength,[nb 3] the battalion had been under constant air attack during its journey and was reduced to around 17 serviceable tanks.[54][nb 4] The battalion's 1st Company was situated 5.6 miles (9.0 km) northeast of Villers-Bocage; the 2nd Company, under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann, was positioned just south of Point 213 on the Villers-Bocage ridge and the 3rd, with only one serviceable tank, was near Falaise and would not reach the front for another two days.[49][55] Wittmann's 2nd Company authorized strength consisted of three platoons. I. Zug (1st platoon) made up of Tigers 211 (SS-Obersturmführer Jürgen Wessel), 212 (SS-Unterscharführer (Sergeant) Balthasar Woll), 213 (SS-Hauptscharführer (Master Sergeant) Hans Höflinger) and 214 (SS-Unterscharführer Karl-Heinz Warmbrunn). II. Zug (2nd platoon) made up of Tigers 221 (SS-Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) Georg Hantusch), 222 (SS-Unterscharführer Kurt Sowa), 223 (SS-Oberscharführer (Company Sergeant Major) Jürgen Brandt) and 224 (SS-Unterscharführer Ewald Mölly). III. Zug (3rd platoon) made up of Tigers 231 (SS-Standartenoberjunker Heinz Belbe), 232 (SS-Unterscharführer Kurt Kleber) 233 (SS-Oberscharführer Georg Lötsch) and 234 (SS-Unterscharführer Herbert Stief),[57] Of these only Tigers 212, 213, 214, 224, 231, and 232 were left on 13 June, but Lieutenant Wessel in Tiger 211 was sent off to establish contact with the Panzer Lehr Division, Tiger 233 was suffering from track damage and 234 from mechanical failure.[10][17]

Battle of Villers-Bocage

Advance

During the early hours of 13 June, riflemen of the 1st Rifle Brigade conducted a reconnaissance along the first half-mile (0.9 km) of the intended British route.[58] Livry was reported to be clear of Germans and the advance resumed at 05:30, with 4CLY leading the way.[39][46][59] Moving cautiously, the column was met at the farms and hamlets along its route by jubilant French civilians,[60] leading to a mood of general relaxation among the soldiers.[61] Information passed to the British—later found to be incorrect—suggested that German tanks were stranded in Tracey-Bocage,[62] and rumours stated that other tanks, without fuel or infantry, were similarly stranded at the Cháteau de Villers-Bocage.[63]

As the column approached Villers-Bocage a German Sd.Kfz. 231 armoured car was sighted some distance off. Its commander had clearly observed the British advance, but the nearest British tank was unable to traverse its turret to engage and by the time a second tank had moved into position the armoured car had withdrawn.[63][64] At 08:30, having safely covered the 5 miles (8.0 km) from its overnight position, the 22nd Armoured Brigade group entered the town to be greeted by celebrating residents; two German soldiers were spotted leaving at high speed in a Volkswagen Kübelwagen car.[65] The two Hussar regiments had also made contact with German forces on either side of the 22nd Brigade group's advance.[66]

Morning fighting

Villers-Bocage is in the bottom left of the map with Point 213 to the northeast in the top right corner. The diagram shows the location of the various British and German battalions in relation to Villers-Bocage at around 09:00 on 13 June 1944.
British and German positions prior to Michael Wittmann's attack.

With Villers-Bocage in British hands A Squadron 4CLY motored ahead to Point 213, but without additional reconnaissance and according to their instructions.[44][67][68] A Kübelwagen encountered on the road was engaged and destroyed,[69] and the tanks moved into hull down positions to establish a defensive perimeter.[63] Along the road between the town and the ridge, the carriers of the Rifle Brigade were ordered to pull over and park nose to tail to allow reinforcements for Point 213 to pass.[63][66][70] The riflemen dismounted and posted sentries, although they could see fewer than 250 yards (230 m) to either side of the road.[65][70]

Major Wright, commanding officer of the 1st Rifle Brigade,[71] called a conference on Point 213 and attended by all officers and senior NCOs of A Company. Moving towards the ridge in a single half-track, it was realised that one enemy shell could wipe out the company's entire command capability, so the half-track's occupants were rapidly dispersed among several other vehicles.[63] In Villers-Bocage, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Arthur Cranley, commanding officer of 4CLY,[72] expressed concern that his men were "out on a limb"; he was assured by Brigadier Hinde that all was well, and ordered to Point 213 to ensure his men had taken up good defensive positions. Hinde then left Villers-Bocage for his headquarters, which had been established to the west of the town.[73]

South of Point 213 with his men of 2nd Company, Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, Wittmann was surprised to discover British armour advancing through Villers-Bocage much sooner than had been expected.[74] He later stated: "I had no time to assemble my company; instead I had to act quickly, as I had to assume that the enemy had already spotted me and would destroy me where I stood. I set off with one tank and passed the order to the others not to retreat a single step but to hold their ground".[75]

"For Christ's sake get a move on! There's a Tiger running alongside us fifty yards away!"

Sergeant O'Connor, 1st Platoon, A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade.[50]

Wittmann's Tiger was spotted at approximately 09:00 by Sergeant O'Connor of the Rifle Brigade, who was travelling towards Point 213 in a half-track and broke radio silence to give the only warning the British force would receive.[50] The Tiger emerged from cover onto Route Nationale 175 and engaged the rearmost tank of A Squadron 4CLY at Point 213—a Cromwell—destroying it.[49][76] A Sherman Firefly responded but was itself "knocked out".[nb 5] Burning, the Firefly came to rest across the road, impeding any attempt to either reinforce the ridge or to withdraw from it.[77] The British at Point 213 then came under fire from the rest of Wittmann's command, losing three more tanks.[1][77]

Several wrecked vehicles along the verge of a tree and hedge lined road. A destroyed gun, twisted metal, and debris occupy the foreground.
The wreckage of the 1st Rifle Brigade's transport column, and a 6 pounder anti-tank gun, on the road between Villers-Bocage and Point 213.

Wittmann now headed for Villers-Bocage.[77] Along the road the men of the Rifle Brigade desperately attempted to find PIAT anti-tank weapons and set up a 6 pounder anti-tank gun, but as the Tiger drew closer panic set in and the riflemen abandoned their efforts to seek shelter. Along the roadside, one by one the brigade's carriers burst into flames as their fuel tanks were ruptured by machine gun and high explosive fire.[77][78][nb 6] However, few casualties were inflicted.[10] Reaching the eastern end of Villers-Bocage, Wittmann engaged three M5 Stuart light tanks of the 4CLY's reconnaissance troop. One, under the command of Lieutenant Ingram, attempted to block the road but was hit, exploding violently.[77] The other two soon followed suit.[78][nb 7]

In the town, the tanks of 4CLY's Regimental Headquarters attempted to escape, but their reverse speed was "painfully slow".[10] One engaged Wittmann's Tiger, managing to get off two shots before being destroyed.[10][82] Two others, their commanders believing they were being engaged from the flank, reversed off the road into gardens; 4CLY's Adjutant, Captain Pat Dyas, found his Cromwell further screened behind a small barn. The Tiger rammed its way past the wrecked Stuart and continued towards the centre of town, knocking out one of the two British tanks but missing Dyas.[82] Lieutenant Charles Pearce took his scout car and, locating the rest of the reconnaissance troop in the middle of town, warned them about what was coming their way. While they quickly got off the road, Pearce continued further west to alert 4CLY's B Squadron.[10] Wittmann, meanwhile, had accounted for another Cromwell,[83] and as he made his way onto Villers-Bocage's main street, destroyed two artillery Observation Post (OP) tanks—a Cromwell and a Sherman[nb 8]—belonging to the 5th Royal Horse Artillery.[84] These were followed by the intelligence officer's scout car and the medical officer's half-track.[86]

A soldier walks up a high street; the sides of the road are covered with rubble. In the foreground there is a knocked out tank, at the foot of the tank there is a dummy wooden gun barrel and debris. Another knocked out tank being examined by another solder occupies the background.
Major Well's Sherman OP tank on the main street in Villers-Bocage[87]

Accounts differ as to what happened next. Historians George Forty and Daniel Taylor record that following the destruction of the OP tanks, Wittmann briefly duelled without success against a Sherman Firefly before withdrawing.[88][89] In the Yeomanry Association's The Sharpshooter newsletter, tanker Robert Moore recalls that he was the one responsible for forcing Wittmann to pull back, when a shot from his tank dented the Tiger's driver visor.[90] These accounts attest that Wittmann's withdrawal brought him face to face with Dyas's Cromwell, which, having been bypassed, had been following the Tiger seeking a shot at its thinner rear armour. Dyas opened fire without effect; Wittmann returned fire and destroyed the British tank.[91] Charles Pearce, however, puts the destruction of Dyas's tank earlier, suggesting that Wittmann had engaged it by traversing the Tiger's turret around before advancing onto the town's main street.[92] The Tiger is then reported to have continued eastwards to the outskirts of Villers-Bocage before being disabled at the road junction to Tilly-sur-Seulles by a 6 Pounder anti-tank gun under the command of Sergeant Bray.[93][nb 9] Wittmann's own account contradicts this; he states that his tank was disabled by an anti-tank gun in the town centre.[75]

In fewer than 15 minutes, 13–14 tanks, two anti-tank guns and 13–15 transport vehicles had been destroyed by the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the vast majority being attributable to Wittmann.[1][96] Now on foot, Wittmann made his way to the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division at the Cháteau d'Orbois, 3.7 miles (6.0 km) north of Villers-Bocage.[93]

Late morning and the fighting on Point 213

Later that morning Major Wenke of the Panzer Lehr Division conducted a reconnaissance of the area. He abandoned his scout car on hearing tank engines, and continuing on foot discovered a column of unoccupied Cromwell tanks. Their crews were with an officer at the front of the column studying a map; Wenke occupied one of the tanks and drove off before the British had a chance to react. At the eastern end of Villers-Bocage he found a scene of "burning tanks and Bren-gun carriers and dead Tommies". Wenke drove his captured tank back to the Panzer Lehr's headquarters at Cháteau d'Orbois.[97]

In the wake of Wittmann's attack on Point 213, A Squadron 4CLY mustered nine operational tanks including two Fireflys and a Cromwell OP tank,[98][99] although some were without their full complement of crew.[56] In support was a single section of riflemen and an equal number of officers.[98] The senior officers conferred, and deciding to hold their position on the ridge until reinforcements arrived, set about organising an all round defence.[99] However, around 10:00 elements of the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101's 4th Company—its support and reconnaissance troops—arrived and began to round up isolated British tankers and riflemen.[100][101] Some British troops who were between the town and ridge managed to evade capture, and over the next 24 hours around 30 worked their way back to British lines.[100]

During the rest of the morning the troops of the 1/7th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (QRR) took up defensive positions within Villers-Bocage, capturing an advance party of three men from the 2nd Panzer Division in the process.[102] A force was put together to attempt to extricate the troops on the ridge, but this was unable to make any progress.[19][103] Around 10:30 Lord Cranley reported over the radio that the position on Point 213 was becoming untenable, and withdrawal was impossible.[9] Nevertheless a breakout was planned, and two hours later a Cromwell attempted to negotiate its way back to Villers-Bocage by a roundabout route, but was knocked out by a German tank. The Germans then started to shell the trees bordering the road, causing the shells to air burst; after five minutes the troops on the ridge decided to surrender.[104] The British made an effort to burn their tanks before they fell into enemy hands, but German soldiers were quick on the scene. 30 members of the County of London Yeomanry were taken prisoner, along with some riflemen and troops of the Royal Horse Artillery.[105] A few men did manage to escape, such as Captain Christopher Milner MC of the Rifle Brigade, who spent the rest of the day on the run and crossed back into British lines after dark.[106]

Two tanks are parked on a grass verge to the left of a road while another tank is parked on the right side being inspected by a group of men. Two men are standing in the middle of the road.
Destroyed British tanks on Point 213 after the German arrival, with two Cromwells on the left and a Sherman Firefly on the right.

On arriving at the Panzer Lehr's headquarters, Wittmann briefed the division's intelligence officer, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Kauffmann, on the situation in Villers-Bocage. Kauffmann ordered Captain Helmut Ritgen to assemble what force he could and block the northern exits to the town. With 15 Panzer IV tanks from the division and a further 10 collected from a workshop south of Route Nationale 175,[102][107] Ritgen rendezvoused with the Panzer Lehr Division's commanding officer, Fritz Bayerlein, at Villy-Bocage. Bayerlein gave Ritgen his orders,[103] but as Ritgen's tanks moved towards Villers-Bocage they ran into a screen of anti-tank guns, losing one tank that burst into flames.[108]

In Villers-Bocage, A Company 1/7th Queen's Royal Regiment was tasked with securing the railway station and surrounding area, while B and C companies were to occupy the eastern side of the town.[9] However, German infantry had already started to infiltrate Villers-Bocage, and scattered house to house fighting and skirmishing broke out.[109] Two German tanks were damaged and driven off, but the QRR battalion's infantry companies were rapidly losing cohesion and were ordered to fall back to reorganise. A Company was again ordered to secure the railway station, while C Company was assigned the north-eastern edge of the town and D Company the south-eastern edge. B Company was placed in reserve, and the battalion's anti-tank guns distributed along the front line.[110] At the town square an ambush site was established by Lieutenant Bill Cotton of 4CLY. A Sherman Firefly and several Cromwell tanks, supported by a 6 pounder anti-tank gun and infantrymen from 1/7th QRR armed with PIAT anti tank weapons, laid in wait for German tanks to move down the town's main street.[19] Fighting was also taking place to the west of the town as the Germans attacked the 1/5th QRR near Livry, losing one tank in the process.[102]

Wittmann was provided with a Schwimmwagen by the Panzer Lehr and returned to Point 213.[19][111] By the time he arrived the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101's 1st Company, under the command of Captain Rolf Möbius, was on the scene, but although the two discussed the situation, Wittmann played no further part in the battle.[19][112][nb 10]

Afternoon battle

Three stationary tanks, one in the foreground and two in the rear, in a heavily damaged street; rubble covers the road.
Knocked out German tanks on the main street of Villers-Bocage. The devastation caused to the town was only partially caused by the battle; at first light on 14 June RAF Hawker Typhoons attacked the town hours before these photos were taken.[110]

Fighting resumed at around 13:00.[117] The tanks of the Panzer Lehr attempted to push into Villers-Bocage, but unsupported by infantry, found the going difficult. At the town's southern edge two tanks were disabled and a further two knocked out by British anti-tank gunfire. Some of the Waffen-SS Tiger tanks were brought up, and in an exchange of fire they silenced the anti-tank position.[110] Continuing along the main road, the Tigers advanced slowly, their commanders confident that they could intimidate the British into withdrawing.[118] However, as they reached the town square they ran into Cotton's ambush.[119] The Firefly, commanded by Sergeant Bramall,[nb 11][118] opened fire on the lead tank and missed, but the anti-tank gun supporting the position knocked it out.[119] Now alerted to the ambush, a following group of three Tigers split up. Picking their way through the back streets in an attempt to flank the British, one was engaged by an anti-tank gun and destroyed. The other two were tackled by infantry using PIAT anti-tank weapons; one was knocked out and the other immobilised.[118][122]

A pencil drawing of road intersection and three tanks; one tank fires, through a partially destroyed building, at another. The barrel of an anti-tank gun can be seen in the bottom right corner of the drawing.
An artists impression of the Tiger being engaged though the corner window by Bramall's Sherman Firefly.

A fifth Tiger had halted on the main street short of the ambush site, apparently waiting for the British to emerge from cover.[122] This tank was spotted by Bramall through the side and front windows of a corner building,[123] and he decided that the only way to safely engage would be to reverse his Firefly and shoot diagonally through the building's windows.[122] His tank fired twice, damaging the Tiger's gun mantlet; it drew back slightly and then raced past the side street before Bramall could react. A Cromwell under the command of Corporal Horne then advanced onto the main street from another side street and fired into the Tiger's rear, knocking it out, before reversing back into cover.[123] The next victim of the ambush was a Panzer IV, accounted for by Bramall's Firefly.[122] Mindful of the German skill at recovering and repairing their damaged vehicles, during a lull in the fighting Lieutenant Cotton and Sergeant Bramall, with blankets and petrol, went to each knocked out tank in their vicinity and set them on fire.[122]

"Bill Cotton, sheltering under an umbrella, remonstrated with the French Fire Brigade for attempting to put out a fire in a disabled German Mk IV tank."

Robert Moore[90]

Supported by mortars and artillery,[124] the Germans put in a strong attack on A Company 1/7th QRR. The company was forced to centralise its defence,[125] and a platoon was cut off and captured.[124] Even though the entire battalion had been committed to the town's defence, holes were opening up through which German troops were infiltrating. By 18:00 the battalion headquarters was pinned down,[125] and as pressure built, Brigadier Hinde reluctantly decided that the situation in Villers-Bocage was becoming untenable and that his force must be withdrawn.[124] Under cover of artillery fire and a smoke screen laid by 5RHA, the infantry pulled back; last to leave were the tanks of 4CLY.[126]

Casualties

Sources contradict one another on the casualties suffered by the 22nd Armoured Brigade group on the 13 June. George Forty notes that the losses for the period of 13 and 14 June amount to 378 men, although his figure is only for the principle three units during the 48 hours of fighting. It breaks down as such: 4th CLY, 15 officers and 86 other ranks; 1st Rifle Brigade, 4 officers and 145 other ranks; and 1st/7th Queens, 8 officers and 120 other ranks.[127]

Looking specifically at 13 June, Major Hastings places the losses of the Rifle Brigade at 80 men;[128] Daniel Taylor states these 80 men came from A Company but most were captured and only nine men were killed.[129] Carlo D’Este places the casualties of the 4CLY at four men killed in action, five wounded, and a further 76 men missing, a total of 85 casualties.[130] Taylor, using information from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, places the actual number of men killed from the 4CLY at 12 instead of four.[129] Patrick Delaforce reports that 1/7QRR suffered 44 casualties during the battle;[131] of which only seven were killed.[129] Delaforce confirms that 1/5QRR along with the 5RHA also suffered casualties;[131] the Commonwealth War Graves Commission confirms two men killed from the 5RHA, no deaths within the 1/5QRR or the 65th Anti-tank Regiment, one man killed in both the 1RTR and 5RTR, and four men killed from the 8th Hussars.[129] This information suggests that around 217 British casualties were sustained on the 13 June.

Daniel Taylor notes that a definitive German casualty figure is not easy to establish, due to the fact that Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer Division did not count the casualties sustained at Villers-Bocage separately from all losses incurred that day. However, he notes that because the SS Heavy Panzer Battalion 101 was only active at Villers-Bocage on 13 June, the losses this unit sustained during the battle are available. He places the losses of the 1st Company at nine men killed and 10 wounded while the 2nd Company sustained one man killed and three wounded.[129] Hubert Meyer places the battalion’s losses lower by one man; 10 killed and 12 wounded.[132]

The number of machines lost on both sides is also difficult to establish. Taylor reports that the 22nd Armoured Brigade group lost 23 tanks during 13 June: 16 Cromwells, four Fireflys, and three Stuarts. Taylor notes that A Squadron lost all 11 Cromwell tanks that it entered the battle with, as well as the four Fireflys; B Squadron lost a single Cromwell, the Regimental Headquarters lost four Cromwells and the Reconnaissance troop lost the three light tanks.[112] Major L.F. Ellis, the British official campaign historian, places the tank losses at 25,[11] whereas both D’Este and Delaforce claim 27 tanks were lost, breaking that figure down to three light tanks, 20 Cromwells, and four Fireflys.[120][130] Forty notes that the Brigade group did lose this number of tanks but over a 48-hour period of 13–14 June.[127] Ellis also states that 14 halftracks and 14 universal carriers were lost during the battle;[11] a figure supported by Delaforce,[120] while D’Este notes that a further three scout cars were also knocked out.[130]

German tank losses are placed between eight and 15 tanks. Forty states that sources differ on the number of tanks lost by the Germans during the afternoon battle[19] and Taylor notes that due to the elements of the Panzer Lehr being thrown into the battle piecemeal it is impossible to be certain of the numbers of Panzer IVs knocked out during the battle.[112]

Michael Reynolds records the loss of six Tigers and two Panzer IVs, that were found knocked out in the town following the battle.[133] Forty notes that up to six Tigers and three Panzer IVs were knocked out during the fighting;[19] a figure supported by the 7th Armoured Division's divisional history.[134] Chester Wilmot quotes Fritz Bayerlein, who reports the loss of six Tigers at Villers-Bocage; Wilmot then notes what a costly loss this was, as there were only 36 Tiger tanks in Normandy at that time.[65] Patrick Delaforce claims the British knocked out 15 German tanks during the fighting[120] while Taylor reports the British claimed to have knocked out 14 tanks. The 4CLY claimed four Tigers and three Panzer IVs, the Rifle Brigade claimed one Tiger, while the 1/7QRR claimed knocking out four Tigers with 6 pounder anti-tank guns and a further Tiger and Panzer IV with PIAT anti-tank weapons. Taylor concedes that while five Tiger tanks were destroyed, the numbers claimed by the British probably include tanks that were immobilised but subsequently recovered.[112] Additionally the Germans lost one armoured car, one Kübelwagen, and two half-tracks.[69][95]

Aftermath

14 June

With their withdrawal from Villers-Bocage complete, on 14 June Hinde's 22nd Armoured Brigade group formed an all round defensive position—a "brigade box"—in the Amayé-sur-Seulles–Tracy-Bocage–St-Germain area.[nb 12] The fighting that followed is known by two names: "The Battle of the Brigade Box";[138] and "The Battle of the Island Position",[127] the latter deriving from the 22nd Armoured Brigade's after action report, which referred to the box as the Island Position.[126]

A photo taken from the air, plumes of smoke rise over a town.
The town of Villers-Bocage, photographed during the bombing raid on 30 June 1944.

Supported by the 1st Company Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the Panzer Lehr Division renewed its attempt to eliminate the British salient.[138][139] Heavy Allied artillery fire broke up the German infantry's initial assault but subsequent efforts closed in so tightly that further artillery concentrations could not be called in. One British platoon was overrun and a counterattack with tanks and infantry was mounted to restore the integrity of the position. The Germans then subjected the box to harassing fire before launching a major two-pronged assault later in the day, supported by artillery and tanks.[138][140][141][142] This penetrated the British lines, closing in on the brigade headquarters before being driven back. The fighting died down during the evening.[140] Although confident that the position could be held, the inability of British forces outside the box to make progress towards relieving the position prompted the decision to recall the Brigade group and straighten the front line.[138][143] The withdrawal, codenamed Operation Aniseed, began just after midnight.[138][140]

An estimated 700–800 casualties were inflicted upon the Germans during the 14 June battle and between eight and 20 tanks were destroyed including several Tigers.[140][141][144] British casualties were reported as light, including the loss of only three tanks.[140] Michael Reynolds disputes the stated German casualty figures, calling them "exaggerated",[139] although Niklas Zetterling points out that by 16 June the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 had only 15 operational tanks; they had lost nine destroyed with a further 21 under repair.[145]

Bombing and liberation

Three soldiers sit on a tank while two more stand next to it.
Bill Cotton (on the left wearing a looted Iron Cross) and his tank crew.

In support of Operation Aniseed, 300 Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers dropped 1,700 tons of high explosives on the town of Évrecy and on targets around Villers-Bocage, destroying one Tiger tank of the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 and damaging three more.[4]

Just over two weeks later in support of Operation Epsom, at 20:30 on 30 June Villers-Bocage was bombed again, and was destroyed by 250 RAF heavy bombers dropping 1,100 tons of bombs.[146][147] Since the town was a vital traffic centre for the German forces, it was hoped that German troops would be caught in the bombing, but only French civilians were present at the time.[146] The town was finally liberated by a patrol of the 1st Battalion Dorset Regiment, 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, on 4 August 1944.[148]

Command changes

In early August, up to 100 men including Bucknall, Erskine, Hinde, and other senior officers, were removed from their positions and reassigned. Historians largely agree that this was a consequence of the failure at Villers-Bocage, and had been planned since the battle.[149][150][151][152] Daniel Taylor, however, is of the opinion that the battle's outcome simply provided a convenient excuse, and that the sackings took place to "demonstrate that the army command was doing something to counteract the poor public opinion of the conduct of the campaign".[151]

Battle honours and awards

In 1956 and 1957, the British and Commonwealth system of battle honours recognised participation in the Battle of Villers-Bocage by the award to 11 units of the battle honour Villers Bocage, for service in expanding the bridgehead from 8–15 June.[153]

For his actions at Villers-Bocage, Michael Wittmann was promoted to Hauptsturmführer (Captain) and awarded Swords to his Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.[154] For their skill and bravery in defending Villers-Bocage, Lieutenant Cotton was awarded the Military Cross and Sergeant Bramall the Military Medal.[122]

Analysis

Because the British had lost contact with their forces on Point 213 and withdrawn from Villers-Bocage, they were unable to establish the full extent of either their own losses or those they had inflicted. The German propaganda machine seized this opportunity.[155] Michael Wittmann—already a household name in Germany[154]—was credited with all the British tanks destroyed at Villers-Bocage.[155] He recorded a radio message on the evening of 13 June, describing his role in the morning's fighting and claiming that later counterattacks had destroyed an entire British armoured regiment and infantry battalion.[75] To lend weight to this claim, doctored images were produced; three joined-together photographs published in the German armed forces magazine Signal gave a false impression of the scale of destruction in the town.[156] The propaganda campaign was given credence both in Germany and abroad, leaving the British convinced that the Battle of Villers-Bocage had been a complete disaster when in fact its results were less conclusive.[155] Historian John Buckley believes that the German wartime propaganda has influenced subsequent published historical works, with Wittmann's role exaggerated to such an extent that historians such as Carlo D'Este and Gary Simpson imply that Wittmann single-handedly stopped the entire 7th Armoured Division. Buckley points to Russell A. Hart's erroneous claim that Wittmann "all but annihilated" 7th Armoured's spearhead.[157]

The British also attempted to manufacture capital from the battle. Having escaped from their knocked-out tank, Lieutenant Cloudsley-Thompson and his crew, of 4CLY, spent much of the day hiding in a basement in Villers-Bocage. They made their way back to British lines after dark, and were picked up by elements of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. During his debriefing Cloudsley-Thompson emphatically stated that he "never wished to see another tank as long [he] lived", but when the British press ran a story on the battle, this became: "The first thing the five tank men asked for was another tank."[158]

A knocked out tank sits at the side of a road, in front of a two story house.
A knocked out Cromwell tank in Villers-Bocage.

Unimpressed by the misinformation surrounding the battle, historian Wolfgang Schneider describes the actions of Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 as "everything but awe-inspiring".[159] He calls into question some of Wittmann's tactical decisions, claiming "a competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes".[159] Criticising Wittmann's disposition of his forces before the battle, Schneider notes that by having his Tigers position themselves in a sunken lane with a vehicle with engine trouble at the head of a stationary column, he was hampering the mobility of his unit and risked blocking the entire company. However, Schneider saves his real opprobrium for Wittmann's solitary advance into Villers-Bocage. Although he acknowledges Wittmann's courage, he points out that such an action "goes against all the rules". No intelligence was gathered beforehand, and there was no "centre of gravity" or "concentration of forces" in the attack. Schneider claims that because of Wittmann's actions, "the bulk of the 2nd Company and Rolf Möbius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive".[159] He calls Wittman's "carefree" advance into British-occupied positions "pure folly", and states that "such over hastiness was uncalled for". Schneider goes on to surmise that if Wittmann had properly prepared an assault involving the rest of his company and the 1st Company, far greater results could have been achieved. He concludes with the belief that "thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost [Wittmann] his life on August 9, 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank."[159]

Most historians and commentators have been equally scathing about the British handling of the battle. John Buckley is of the opinion that the British had only themselves to blame for their failure at Villers-Bocage; he gives little credence to a view that superior German armour decided the outcome.[160] While approving of the 7th Armoured Division's institution of a flexible combined arms structure prior to the battle—a structure that other British armoured divisions would not adopt until after Operation Goodwood[161]—Mungo Melvin writes that neither the 131st Infantry Brigade nor the balanced divisional reserve, of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion, were employed effectively.[161] Buckley further notes that the 151st Infantry Brigade was available in corps reserve, and elements of the 7th Armoured Division remained uncommitted.[160] Although Ellis excuses the battle's outcome by claiming that, with the unexpected arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 7th Armoured Division "could hardly have achieved full success",[162] Buckley dismisses this, stating that the order to retreat was given before the 2nd Panzer Division arrived in any real strength.[160] Michael Reynolds further refutes Ellis's claim; he points out that "2nd Panzer's tanks were nowhere near Villers-Bocage at this time".[116]

Two tanks are positioned on either side of a street with a soldier standing in the middle of the road; the road is damaged and scattered with debris.
A knocked out Panzer IV in Villers-Bocage.

The British Second Army commander, Miles Dempsey, remarked after the war that "this attack by 7th Armoured Division should have succeeded. My feeling that Bucknall and Erskine would have to go started with that failure ... the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace. Their decision to withdraw [from Villers-Bocage] was done by the corps commander and Erskine."[163] Although Carlo D'Este calls Dempsey's comments "excessively harsh",[164] historians generally support them, suggesting that Bucknall squandered a great opportunity to swiftly capture Caen.[4][5][6] Fully supporting Dempsey, Buckley claims that Bucknall was unprepared to support the attack once problems developed, and that Erskine was not suited to the task at hand.[165] Chester Wilmot agrees, stating that Bucknall refused to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division, having already concluded that its lines of communication were endangered. Wilmot goes on to suggest that the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage was not forced upon the division—the German counterattack had been defeated—but was ordered by Bucknall.[166] The British official Normandy campaign historian, Major L. F. Ellis, explains the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage as only a temporary measure; the 7th Armoured Division was to be reinforced with the 33rd Armoured Brigade before renewing its offensive towards Évrecy.[167] David French states that the follow-up formations landing in Normandy were, on average, two days behind schedule. He speculates that, had the 7th Armoured Division's infantry brigade, the 49th Infantry Division, and the 33rd Armoured Brigade landed on schedule, XXX Corps might have been able to secure Villers-Bocage before the arrival of substantial German forces.[168] However, quoting a German general, D'Este notes that by withdrawing the British failed to exploit the gap in the German front line and abandoned the possibility of successfully flanking I SS Panzer Corps. He cites the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage as the moment that ended any hopes of unhinging the German front line south of Caen.[5]

Notes

Footnotes
  1. ^ Daniel Taylor states that there was a total of 16 Tiger tanks in the area,[17] which were later supplemented by 25 Panzer IVs.[14] George Forty gives a total of 16 Tiger tanks[18] and 15 Panzer IVs.[19]
  2. ^ Daniel Taylor states that only the lead tank was destroyed,[40] while George Forty claims that two tanks were lost.[41]
  3. ^ Taylor states 14 tanks per company with a further 3 making up the headquarters unit.[16]
  4. ^ Michael Reynolds states that the battalion's 1st Company had nine tanks, the 2nd Company six and the 3rd Company only one tank.[55] Daniel Taylor and George Forty both agree that the Second Company consisted of six tanks.[10][49] Taylor suggests that the 1st Company had ten tanks available while Forty suggests eight.[49][56]
  5. ^ Rendered incapable of completing its mission; knocked out encompasses a range of effects from being immobilised (a Mobility kill in modern US parlance) to being made defenceless (a Firepower kill) to complete destruction (a Catastrophic kill).
  6. ^ Some French sources, along with British eyewitness accounts of the fighting, report that the Rifle Brigade's transport was in fact engaged by two Tigers.[79] It is speculated that the second German tank was positioned north of the main road, near the road junction to Tilly-sur-Seulles, and was possibly out of fuel.[79]
  7. ^ The claim of the destruction of three Stuart tanks has been disputed. Daniel Taylor, in After The Battle magazine, states that the third light tank "may not have been taken precisely where I originally thought".[80] This view is supported by historian Walter Allen, who writes that the third Stuart tank was knocked out elsewhere: "As Brigadier Hinde had been up in his scout car and had said that the town must be held at all costs. Major Aird set about reorganizing the defence. Some of the Queen's infantry had arrived with anti-tank guns and these, with tank troops were dispersed round the roads leading into the Square. To the south Lt. Simons, in charge of a troop of Honeys [the nickname given to the Stuart by British forces], had had his tank knocked out by a mortar, so his patrol was drawn in."[81]
  8. ^ The Sherman OP tank was equipped with a dummy main gun made of wood;[83][84] its weapon had been removed to make room for a map table and additional radio equipment.[76] The Cromwell retained its main armament.[85]
  9. ^ A radio report logged at XXX Corps at 09:45 claims a Tiger knocked out by an anti-tank gun to the east of the town, and in the Rifle Brigade's regimental history Sergeant Bray is credited with knocking out a Tiger tank.[94] However, in his book on the Rifle Brigade, Major Hasting omits this, crediting Sergeant Bray with the destruction of two half-tracks and an armoured car.[95]
  10. ^ Some historians have suggested that Michael Wittmann took part in later fighting on Point 213 or participated in the afternoon counterattack. Carlo D’Este describes how, after engaging the Firefly from B Squadron, Wittmann withdrew from the town "into the woods southeast of Villers-Bocage" and "returned to his unit to re-arm and re-fuel"; D’Este then goes on to claim that Wittmann renewed the attack on Point 213 before launching a second attack on Villers-Bocage.[113] Anthony Beevor suggests that Wittmann attacked elements of B Squadron, who were incapable of replying, before turning around and returning to Point 213 to "finish the battle with A Squadron".[15] These accounts are contradicted by Wittmann’s personal testimony; he states that his tank was disabled in the town and he immediately proceeded on foot to the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division.[75] Sepp Dietrich supports this, noting that Wittmann left the town on foot during the morning, later returning to Point 213 by car.[114] Beevor, Max Hastings, and Deitrich all suggest that Wittmann was involved in the afternoon counterattack on Villers-Bovage; Beevor placing him alongside the 2nd Panzer Division, while Dietrich claims he directed the 1st Company, SS Heavy Panzer Battalion 101.[15][114][115] George Forty challenges Dietrich's suggestion, asking "[why] would a competent, experienced SS captain like Möbius [the commanding officer of the 1st Company] defer to an officer of lower rank, however expert, and let him lead the attack?"[111] Beevor's assertion that tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division took part in this battle is dismissed by historian Michael Reynolds, who writes that their tanks were "nowhere near Villers-Bocage at the time".[116] Daniel Taylor credits Obersturmfuher Hannes Philipsen, from the 1st Company, with leading the attack into Villers-Bocage,[110] and states that after briefing Möbius, Wittmann was "whisked away to report to ... Sepp Dietrich ... and a number of eager journalists. It was they who made the most of the story."[112]
  11. ^ Daniel Taylor spells this name as 'Brammall',[118] but both George Forty and Patrick Delaforce spell it as 'Bramall',[120][121] so the latter spelling has been used.
  12. ^ There is some dispute as to the precise location of the Brigade Box. Carlo D'Este states it was between Amayé-sur-Seulles and Tracy-Bocage, around Hill 174.[135] Dan Taylor locates the box around the brigade's tactical headquarters positioned on Hill 174 and presents a map showing the brigade mostly to the south of the village of Amayé-sur-Seulles.[136] George Forty places the box to the north of Tracy-Bocage, around the hamlet of St-Germain,[137] and draws on a report by the 22nd Armoured Brigade group's commanding officer who states the position was east of Amayé-sur-Seulles and included St-Germain.[127]


Citations
  1. ^ a b c Forty, p. 66
  2. ^ a b Taylor, p. 3
  3. ^ Taylor, pp. 76, 82
  4. ^ a b c Reynolds, p. 107
  5. ^ a b c D'Este, pp. 197–198
  6. ^ a b Wilmot, pp. 310–311
  7. ^ a b c Taylor, p. 10
  8. ^ a b Taylor, pp. 11–12
  9. ^ a b c Forty, p. 73
  10. ^ a b c d e f g Forty, p. 61
  11. ^ a b c d e Ellis, p. 254
  12. ^ a b Forty, p. 51
  13. ^ Taylor, p. 6
  14. ^ a b Taylor, pp. 43, 51
  15. ^ a b c Beevor, p. 192
  16. ^ a b Taylor, p. 8
  17. ^ a b Taylor, pp. 17–18
  18. ^ Forty, p. 133
  19. ^ a b c d e f g Forty, p. 74
  20. ^ Williams, p. 24
  21. ^ Wilmot, pp. 284–286
  22. ^ Trew, p. 22
  23. ^ Stacey, p. 142
  24. ^ Ellis, p. 247
  25. ^ Ellis, p. 250
  26. ^ Clay, p. 256
  27. ^ Gill, p. 24
  28. ^ Forty, p. 37
  29. ^ Forty, p. 29
  30. ^ Taylor, p. 9
  31. ^ a b Buckley (2006), p. 59
  32. ^ a b Weigley, pp. 109–110
  33. ^ Hart, p. 134
  34. ^ Buckley (2004), p. 24
  35. ^ a b Wilmot, p. 308
  36. ^ a b Forty, p. 47
  37. ^ Clay, p. 257
  38. ^ a b c Fortin, p. 13
  39. ^ a b c d Forty, p. 50
  40. ^ a b c Taylor, p. 11
  41. ^ Forty, p. 126
  42. ^ a b Taylor, p. 12
  43. ^ Forty, p. 52
  44. ^ a b D'Este, p. 177
  45. ^ a b Reynolds, p. 101
  46. ^ a b Taylor, p. 15
  47. ^ Reynolds, p. 111
  48. ^ Forty, p. 82
  49. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 18
  50. ^ a b c d Forty, p. 57
  51. ^ Reynolds, p. 96
  52. ^ Reynolds, p. 97
  53. ^ Reynold, pp. 99–100
  54. ^ a b Reynolds, pp. 80, 99
  55. ^ a b Reynolds, p. 100
  56. ^ a b Forty, p. 68
  57. ^ Agte, p. 179
  58. ^ Taylor, pp. 12–13
  59. ^ Taylor, p. 13
  60. ^ Taylor, pp. 15–16
  61. ^ Forty, p. 55
  62. ^ Neillands, p. 226
  63. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 16
  64. ^ Forty, pp. 54–55
  65. ^ a b c Wilmot, p. 309
  66. ^ a b Lindsay, p. 36
  67. ^ Neillands, p. 221
  68. ^ Buckley (2004), p. 25
  69. ^ a b Forty, p. 56
  70. ^ a b Hastings (1950), p. 350
  71. ^ Forty, p. 125
  72. ^ Forty, p. 20
  73. ^ Forty, p. 132
  74. ^ Forty, p. 58
  75. ^ a b c d Taylor, p. 38
  76. ^ a b Reynolds, p. 103
  77. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 19
  78. ^ a b Forty, p. 60
  79. ^ a b Forty, p. 59
  80. ^ Daniel Taylor, "Villers-Bocage Revisited". After the Battle Issue 132, p. 34
  81. ^ Allen, Chapter 12
  82. ^ a b Taylor, p. 23
  83. ^ a b Taylor, p. 24
  84. ^ a b Forty, p. 137
  85. ^ Taylor, p. 28
  86. ^ Forty, p. 62
  87. ^ Taylor, p. 27
  88. ^ Taylor, p. 30
  89. ^ Forty, p. 64
  90. ^ a b Robert Moore,"Villers-Bocage – Bob Moore writes" The Sharpshooter Newsletter 2003, p. 18
  91. ^ Taylor, p.30
  92. ^ J. L. Cloudsley-Thompson,"Return to Villers-Bocage" The Sharpshooter Newsletter 2003, p. 18
  93. ^ a b Forty, p. 65
  94. ^ Taylor, p. 34
  95. ^ a b Hastings (1950), p. 351
  96. ^ Taylor, p. 33
  97. ^ Neillands, pp. 225–226
  98. ^ a b Taylor, p. 41
  99. ^ a b Forty, p. 143
  100. ^ a b Taylor, p. 42
  101. ^ Forty, pp. 42–43
  102. ^ a b c Taylor, p. 43
  103. ^ a b Taylor, p. 45
  104. ^ Taylor, p .51
  105. ^ Taylor, p. 56
  106. ^ Forty, pp. 147–148
  107. ^ Taylor, p. 51
  108. ^ Forty, p. 151
  109. ^ Forty, p. 153
  110. ^ a b c d Taylor, p. 59
  111. ^ a b Forty, p. 149
  112. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 76
  113. ^ D’Este, pp. 181-182
  114. ^ a b Meyer, pp. 234, 558
  115. ^ Hastings (1999), p. 159
  116. ^ a b Reynolds, p. 109
  117. ^ Fortin, p. 6
  118. ^ a b c d Taylor, p. 65
  119. ^ a b Forty, p. 154
  120. ^ a b c d Delaforce, p. 38
  121. ^ Forty , p. 154
  122. ^ a b c d e f Forty, p. 156
  123. ^ a b Taylor, p. 67
  124. ^ a b c Forty, p. 76
  125. ^ a b Taylor, p. 69
  126. ^ a b Forty, p. 77
  127. ^ a b c d Forty, p. 78
  128. ^ Hastings (1950), p. 352
  129. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 85
  130. ^ a b c D'Este, p. 182
  131. ^ a b Delaforce, p. 39
  132. ^ Meyer, p. 237
  133. ^ Reynolds, p. 106
  134. ^ Lindsay, p. 37
  135. ^ D'Este, p. 184
  136. ^ Taylor, pp. 76–77
  137. ^ Forty, p. 81
  138. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 77
  139. ^ a b Reynolds, p. 110
  140. ^ a b c d e Taylor, p. 78
  141. ^ a b Forty, p. 85
  142. ^ Forty, p. 84
  143. ^ Forty, p. 160
  144. ^ Forty, p. 87
  145. ^ Zetterling, 101. SS-Pz.Abt.
  146. ^ a b Jackson, p. 56
  147. ^ Reynolds, p. 26
  148. ^ Clay, p. 267
  149. ^ Fortin, p. 10
  150. ^ Forty, p. 104
  151. ^ a b Taylor, p. 84
  152. ^ Wilmot, p. 398
  153. ^ Rodger, p. 242
  154. ^ a b Forty, p. 134
  155. ^ a b c Taylor, p. 82
  156. ^ Taylor, p. 37
  157. ^ Buckley (2004), pp. 23, 222
  158. ^ Taylor, p. 39
  159. ^ a b c d Marie, p. 159
  160. ^ a b c Buckley, p. 26
  161. ^ a b Buckley (2006), pp. 28–29
  162. ^ Ellis, p. 256
  163. ^ D'Este, p. 196
  164. ^ D'Este, p. 197
  165. ^ Buckley (2004), p. 27
  166. ^ Wilmot, p. 310
  167. ^ Ellis, p. 255
  168. ^ French, p. 118

References

  • Agte, Patrick (2000). Michael Wittmann erfolgreichster Panzerkommandant im Zweiten Weltkrieg und die Tiger der Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (in German). Rosenheim: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft Preußisch Oldendorf. ISBN ISBN 3-920-72218-3. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  • Allen, Walter Douglas (1997). Cawston, Roy (ed.). Carpiquet Bound: Pictorial Tribute to the 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) 1939 to 1944. Ewell: Chiavari Publishing. ISBN 0-95205-926-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
  • Beevor, Anthony (2009). D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. London: Viking. ISBN 978-067088-703-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Buckley, John (2006) [2004]. British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944. London: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-41540-773-7. OCLC 154699922. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Text "Abingdon" ignored (help)
  • Buckley, John, ed. (2007) [2006]. The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years on. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-041544-942-7.
  • Clay, Major Ewart W (1950). The path of the 50th: The story of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division in the Second World War. Aldershot: Gale and Polden. OCLC 12049041.
  • Delaforce, Patrick (2003) [1999]. Churchill's Desert Rats: From Normandy to Berlin with the 7th Armoured Division. Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd; New edition. ISBN 0-75093-198-1. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • D'Este, Carlo (2004) [1983]. Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. London: Penguin Books Ltd. ISBN 0-14101-761-9. OCLC 44772546.
  • Ellis, Major L.F.; with Allen, Captain G.R.G. Allen; Warhurst, Lieutenant-Colonel A.E.; Robb, Air Chief-Marshal Sir James (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO 1962]. Butler, J.R.M (ed.). Victory in the West, Volume I: The Battle of Normandy. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Naval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84574-058-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |lastauthoramp= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
  • Fortin, Ludovic (2004). British Tanks In Normandy. Paris: Histoire & Collections. ISBN 2-91523-933-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Forty, George (2004). Villers Bocage. Battle Zone Normandy. Stroud: Sutton Publishing. ISBN 0-75093-012-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • French, David (2001) [2000]. Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-019924-630-4. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Gill, Ronald (2006) [1946]. Club Route in Europe: The History of 30 Corps from D-Day to May 1945. MLRS Books. ISBN 978-1-90569-624-6. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Hart, Stephen Ashley (2007) [2000]. Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-81173-383-1. OCLC 70698935. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Hastings, Max (1999) [1984]. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944. Pan Grand Strategy Series. London: Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-39012-0.
  • Hastings, Major R.H.W.S. (1950). The Rifle Brigade In The Second World War 1939-1945. Gale & Polden. ASIN B000X890UK. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)
  • Jackson, G.S. (2006) [1945]. 8 Corps: Normandy to the Baltic. Smalldale: MLRS Books. ISBN 978-1-905696-25-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Lindsay, Captain Martin; Johnson, Captain M.E.; Harris, Captain N.B. (2005). History of 7th Armoured Division: June 1943 - July 1945. MLRS Books. ISBN 978-1-84791-219-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
  • Marie, Henri (2004) [1993]. Villers-Bocage: Normandy 1944. Bayeux: Editions Heimdal; Bilingual edition. ISBN 978-284048-173-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Meyer, Hubert (2005) [1994]. The 12th SS: The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume I. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-081173-198-0.
  • Neillands, Robin (2005). The Desert Rats: 7th Armoured Division, 1940-1945. London: Aurum Press Ltd. ISBN 978-184513-115-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
  • Reynolds, Michael (2001). Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. Da Capo Press Inc. ISBN 1-88511-944-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
  • Rodger, Alexander (2003). Battle Honours of the British Empire and Commonwealth Land Forces. Marlborough: The Crowood Press. {{cite book}}: Text "isbn 1-86126-637-5" ignored (help)
  • Stacey, Colonel Charles Perry (1960). "Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume III. The Victory Campaign: The operations in North-West Europe 1944–1945" (PDF). The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery Ottawa. Retrieved 20 August 2008. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |origdate= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • "The Villers-Bocage Debate" (PDF), The Sharpshooter Newsletter, no. 2003, 10 Stone Buildings, Lincolns Inn, London, pp. 17–18, retrieved 1 October 2009{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  • Taylor, Daniel (2006), "Villers-Bocage Revisited", After the Battle, no. Issue 132, The Mews, Hobbs Cross House, Hobbs Cross, Old Harlow, Essex: After the Battle, pp. 30–41 {{citation}}: |issue= has extra text (help)
  • Taylor, Daniel (1999). Villers-Bocage Through the Lens. Old Harlow: Battle of Britain International. ISBN 1-87006-707-X. OCLC 43719285.
  • Trew, Simon; Badsey, Stephen (2004). Battle for Caen. Battle Zone Normandy. Stroud: Sutton Publishing. ISBN 0-75093-010-1. OCLC 56759608.
  • Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945. London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd. ISBN 0-28398-801-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
  • Williams, Andrew (2004). D-Day to Berlin. London: Hodder. ISBN 0-34083-397-1. OCLC 60416729.
  • Wilmot, Chester (1997) [1952]. The Struggle For Europe. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd. ISBN 1-85326-677-9. OCLC 39697844. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Zetterling, Niklas (1999). "The Normandy Campaign 1944: 101. schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung". {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Villers-Bocage.

49°4′50″N 0°39′22″W / 49.08056°N 0.65611°W / 49.08056; -0.65611 (Battle of Villers-Bocage)

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Villers-Bocage&oldid=331131964"