Talk:Perception

Changes

Going to revert the last changes and begin working to integrate their material into the WP article. I have a concern that this appears to be a quotation from a printed/published source and, lacking context for this update, would rather be safe than sorry. PilotPrecise 01:38, 10 March 2004 (UTC)

Discuss this page

Quote from last para of section "Perception and reality ": "The brain, with which you perceive the world, is made up of neurons “buzzing” at 50 cycles a second, while the world as it exists in reality, is made up of electro-magnetic radiation oscillating at 500 trillion cycles a second." With the greatest respect to all concerned, this seems to me to mean absolutely nothing from a scientific perspective. 212.159.59.5 (talk) 16:39, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

There seems to be more types of perception. Along with Color, Depth, Form, and Speech perceptions, there could also be time, and speed perceptions. Time is perceived; when doing activity it seems as though time is progressing faster or slower (a watched pot never boils). Speed is perceived, the perception of traveling slower after exiting a freeway and a reduction of measured speed. Maybe, I am not understanding the meaning of types of perception.

-- Distinction that has to be made --

This page needs to be rewritten to reflect two competing theories (PP and PA - I have added this to the introductory paragraph). Without making this clear in the text, misconceptions (already reflected here) will completely cloud the picture.

Fell free to correct my grammar and, if you wish, wisit my website Imagination is Greater than Knowledge for better understanding of active perception theory.

Damir Ibrisimovic 22:39, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

Dear all,

I guess that my intervention in intro is now redundant. Please, fell free to remove it or adjust it to the current content of the article. Thank you. Damir Ibrisimovic 02:55, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

DEAR ALL THERE IS SOME THING I WANT TO DISCUSS.DOES THINKING HABBITS EXIST [ CERTAIN SPECIFIC IDEAS START TO COME IN MIND WHEN A PERSON IS EXPOSED TO A DEFINITE SITUATIONS INTERMITTENTLY, EVERYTIME THE SAME KIND OF IDEAS START POURING IN], OR IT IS JUST THE PREDECIDED PRIORITIES(WHAT WE CALL HUMAN VALUES) WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 125.62.102.214 (talk) 07:10, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

I was sad to see that this article does not give a summary of the scientific understanding of perception. There is a lot of philosophizing going on throughout the article, but I was hoping to find a general overview of things like brain areas involved in the processing of sensory input. I feel like it would be appropriate to have a distinct article for philosophizing about perception, and another article for giving a general summary of the account of perception that is given by neuroscience. 134.10.125.172 (talk) 06:44, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

modeling

"Many cognitive psychologists hold that, as we move about in the world, we create a model of how the world works" Which psychologists? jVirus File:Confederate Battle Flag.svg 15:21, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

Oh, Jean Piaget, Eleanor Gibson, Ulric Neisser, Donald Norman to name a few old timers. Be more interesting to name any current cognitive psycholigists who deny the same proposition.Edison 21:58, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Object-centered vs. Viewer-centered

Shouldn't this page at least mention these things? It also seems there are no separate pages for them, even though that seems appropriate, too. As far as I know, this is still an ongoing discussion within the field of Perception as understood by Psychology? Gijs Kruitbosch 11:20, 22 December 2006 (UTC)

Perception and reality

This section is not NPOV. It is certainly not agreed upon that we do not directly experience objective reality. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 139.184.30.17 (talk) 11:40, 12 February 2007 (UTC).

I second this. "...if the percept has no grounding in a person's experience, the person may literally not perceive it." I've only seen this position seriously purported by extremely :flaky sources, like What The Bleep do We Know. It is quite the claim to be unsourced. Could be wrong though, any thoughts?

98.217.186.65 (talk) 01:24, 19 May 2008 (UTC)

Areas of Interest

I’m glad to see some changes away from classical interpretations. These changes are based upon solid scientific findings that have significant impact not only in psychology or neurology. (Please do not use “neuroscience” - this is tautology.)

Recent (and not so recent) findings have also significant impact on validity of many claims made in philosophy, sociology and even physics. The example that comes to my mind is entry on consciousness by your philosophically oriented colleagues in Wikipedia. There is not even a note about Benjamin Libet’s findings!

I would suggest that it is time to start to contemplate possible implications and get involved in these areas of interest, for the science should confront unfounded believes.

Cordially,

Damir Ibrisimovic 00:02, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

A Suggestion for Consciousness Related To-do Item

Dethrone the brain as a seat of consciousness in phenomenological sense. (Imagined vs. actually seen images issue.)

Adopt strictly psychological/neurological findings about consciousness in non-phenomenological sense.

This would imply two different types of consciousness that are often awkwardly merged into one.

I would also like to see culture related to-do item.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 01:17, 7 June 2008 (UTC)

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I suggest the following three paragraphs to be added to the page. Feel free to correct my grammar and style. I would also suggest expanding with findings from experimental psychology and neurology. Please, let me know what you think.

What one perceives is a result of interplays between past experiences, one’s culture and the interpretation of the perceived. If the percept does not have support in any of these perceptual bases it is unlikely to rise above perceptual threshold.

Perception gives rise to two types of consciousness; phenomenal and psychological. The difference everybody can demonstrate to himself/herself by simple opening and closing his/her eyes. Phenomenal consciousness is full of rich sensations that are hardly present when eyes are closed.

Psychological consciousness is well researched and measured. It occurs half a second after a stimulus starts. If a weak stimulus lasts less, it is unlikely to be perceived. The capacity of psychological consciousness is also well measured. Depending on methods used the capacity ranges between seven and forty symbols at the time.

Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 00:28, 14 June 2008 (UTC)

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On Talk:Consciousness page I have suggested disambiguation and a new article that will describe consciousness from psychological and neurological aspects. Consciousness is well researched phenomenon in psychology and neurology and should be presented without too much philosophising. The suggested entry could be called Consciousness in Psychology ad should be directed to from the present Consciousness page.

This will make both articles more professional and less controversial.

Also. I’m still waiting for a feedback on the suggested three paragraphs above. Careful read of the article indicates some redundancies and ambiguities within text if only these three paragraphs are added without changes to the rest of text.

If I do not have a negative feedback, I will make the change in a few days.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 03:45, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

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I have included these three paragraphs. However, I do not want to change the text of others. I will only make few observations.

I would be reluctant to talk about altered perception, since there are good reasons to believe that perception cannot occur without fusing stimuli into a percept. We cannot speak about altered perception; only about altered stimuli.

Terms, percept, stimulus and object are loosely treated as synonyms. One could argue that four cut circles offer square as percept, for example. (Absence of stimuli that gives rise to percept.) The term object implies a source of stimuli and should be treated as such and the other two are explained below.

Arguably, non-conscious perception alters stimuli less than conscious, especially when verbally expressed. There is some work in this area that can be presented. If we accept this, the symbol would then be an abstract representation of a range of percepts. (Should we say schemas?) This would also mean that we need to talk about percepts at non-conscious level of perception and symbols at conscious level. This is not to say that percepts are less biased. In fact, we may have the opposite; the symbols may be less biased due to the veto mechanism (ethics?) of our consciousness.

It is important to stress in the rest of the text the interplay between experiences, culture and interpretation. The language, especially, alters the stimuli. There are plenty of examples and findings how these three perceptual bases alter stimuli.

What I termed psychological consciousness has several other terms with moderately different meanings; like access consciousness, for example. This could be pointed out.

The proposed psychological consciousness page should also discuss non-consciousness.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 01:23, 23 June 2008 (UTC)

Reworking

Yikes, just came across this article. It certainly needs some reliable sources. I think there is material out there to back up what is stated under perception and reality, but should it be Perception of Reality? Think there may be some added sections. Like Perception (Philosophy), etc. Now when we look at it perception on a philosophical view is Ontology and there is also different theories on Perception on a more mystical view, such as Vedanta, etc. So maybe a link section linking to these other articles. savasas (talk) 11:57, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

Clarifying Phenomenal Consciousness

I’m glad that a philosophically oriented anonymous is trying to reconcile philosophers’ views on perception with scientific findings. (As far I know, this is the first, courageous attempt.) I am concerned though that we are losing clarity in the article. I invite therefore this person to propose changes first on this, discussion page.

I would also like to see some clarity about consciousness and perception. When we consider the find that there is no difference in the brain between imagined and actually seen - the role of our brain is rather interpretative. In a way, our brain is trying to make sense of our sensations. Philosophers’ phenomenal consciousness would then indicate a combination of both. Furthermore, very few of these interpretations filter down into well researched and measured psychological consciousness. At the moment we can only guess the volume of non-conscious interpretations. To complicate the matter further, non-conscious interpretations seem to be very vague and gaining specifics only when we became conscious of them. For example, when we unexpectedly meet a friend. In reverse, our friend could remain an unspecific person telling us later how she tried to get our attention. Phenomenal consciousness is therefore either a combination of sensations and psychological consciousness or a combination of sensations, psychological consciousness and non-consciousness. Which of these two would be difficult to figure out until we have a firmer grip on non-consciousness.

We also have to keep in mind that our consciousness always lags behind half a second in average. This time is partly needed to add specifics to vague interpretations. As for how vague interpretations gain specifics, see here.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 23:07, 12 February 2009 (UTC)

Introduction

'it is a task far more complex than was imagined in the 1950s and 1960s, when it was predicted that building perceiving machines would take about a decade, a goal which is still very far from fruition.' this is an absolutely ridiculous thing to have in the introduction... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.44.123.167 (talk) 19:27, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

Percept Article

Dear all,

I have rewritten Percept article. Please read it and leave your comments at the related discussion page. I will now look at how we may get more clarity here also.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 21:45, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Redesign

So this article is really lacking in context and clarity. I am going to work on improving it so that it meets Wikipedia's standard. Right now it looks like a freshman philosophy paper. Empireheart (talk) 07:51, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Dear Empireheart,

I can see that you partly managed to turn this scientifically based article into philosophically based article. I do understand that findings in psychology and neuroscience could be confusing to people with philosophical beckground. But this should be an important reason to one to familiriarise himself with these findings. This should not be a reason to impose what one thinks scienfitic findings tell us about perception. And the later, unfortunately, seems to be the choice of some people with philosophical background.

Unlike you, I will not do the chages here directly. I will specify my changes on the discussion page first to be commented upon first. And I hope that you will accept science as starting point; not what some philosopher might have been musing about in history.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 04:37, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Different perceptions

http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/notorious/dahmer/2.html

Maybe you are willing and able to insert this real story of different perceptions into the article's text.

Austerlitz -- 88.75.94.0 (talk) 07:14, 1 August 2009 (UTC)

Perception Related Info

I have modified my talk page. If you are interested in a coherent view about our cognitive and recognitive abilities, I suggest you to visit it.

Kind regards,

Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 04:14, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Rewriting the article

Dear all,

My book is now out and promotional copies will soon go to independent reviewers to enable them to publish their reviews in May/June period. This gave me some time to revisit this article, as promised. Unfortunately, I found that our philosophically oriented colleagues managed to cloud even that little clarity we had. Furthermore, my offer to disambiguate consciousness with a proposed text based upon scientific findings was stonewalled on the grounds of technicality and the inconvenient discussion was deleted later. Their understanding of an article seems to be rather in terms of who said what (hearsay or gossip); regardless of how much sense a reader could derive from all those contradictory views of various philosophers.

Fortunately, there are few philosophers who care about the science behind what they propose. And this includes consciousness from psychological perspective and phenomenal consciousness. And since our philosophically oriented colleagues do not want to disambiguate these two quite different phenomena, I did not have other choice but to disambiguate them here.

Note also that consciousness (in both meanings) and perception are deeply personal. Willy-nilly we must give a meaning to stimuli to perceive it at all; we must think or say “this is hot”, for example, to discriminate between hot and cold. When talking about perception, we cannot therefore use impersonal language you are used to when speaking about others or other things. We must give to the reader clarity with plenty of examples and familiarity in this case. After all, our readers are humans like us or like subjects of our experiments. My drafted proposal for lead is supported, in every word, by scientific finds (and few philosophical works); as are all the articles and the book I wrote. I will add the references as we go, since there are so many that it is hard to choose the most appropriate ones.

Some references to philosophers’ views will have to go or be moved under history or another heading, for clarity sake. Other references, that do not cloud the issue I’ll try to keep, but no promises here - open for discussion. The current graphics of Robert Fludd’s depiction of perception is an excellent candidate for removal.

The heading “Types” is rather artificial since it belongs to introductory remarks of the lead and I summed them up that way. Although this summation belongs rather to history, there are too many readers who learned about the theory of passive perception only. I felt therefore a need to put both theories in the intro to the lead; a surgical cut from what they learned in school.

The heading “Perception and reality” needs to be rewritten. I am thinking about how, but other proposals would be welcome under discussion line.

The heading “Theories of perception” is rather a list of functional aspects of PA theory. We need to either expand the list or move it to notes. The change of the heading text would also be appropriate.

The following are only major points that support the lead and are open for discussion:

Notes: Philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers proposed last year an extended mind theory for phenomenal consciousness that is entirely in line with this presentation of perception. The latest expression of their views could be found here: “What a maze-solving oil drop tells us of intelligence”. Peter Russel proposes something similar. His differences with the other two, however, might be stemming from the demonstrated lack of insights about findings in scientific disciplines other than physics. For the latest expression of his views see this video presentation: “Primacy of Consciousness”.

The most cited finds in genetics that support this presentation of perception are 1) finding that differences in epigenome between twins grow as they accumulate different experiences and 2) two independent studies that practically replicated Europe’s map by looking into a single letter; almost 30% of the second generation of immigrants had their letter changed when compared with their parents’.

Anthropological finds presented in culture and anthropology related articles would suffice for now.

Please add your comments below the draft and, since my English is my second language, please feel free to do minor corrections within the draft.

I am open to all comments and criticisms that have the science backing them. Please resist urges to discuss who said what about perception or consciousness - unless it is in line with facts as we know them now. If not, I will consider such comments irrelevant in the anticipated agreement.

I am also open to all questions. In fact, your questions could help me to identify the most relevant references.

I hope that we will reached an agreement and finalise the lead within two months from now. However, if there is a lack of substantial comments or criticism and I finalise the draft - I will simply rewrite the article.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 10:25, 6 February 2010 (UTC)

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(Intro to the lead)

Historically, perception was considered in terms established by René Descartes: perception → thoughts that lead to a decision (brain) → action. (Compare with principle our computers are built on: input → processing → output.)

This picture has been entirely eroded in the second half of the last century that was crowned by seminal works of Richard L. Gregory, Benjamin Libet and numerous other cognitive psychologists. Aided by mostly non-intrusive equipment they started to map subjective experiences with records of their physical manifestations. The accumulated finds lead to an inevitable conclusion that we are much more active or subjective in what and how we see than we suspected. Consequently, the previous theory of perception received passive as an attribute (PP) and the new, now widely accepted, theory received active as an attribute.

The Active Perception (PA) changes Descartes’ picture into dynamic interplay between environment ↔ our perception of it (default percepts) ↔ our description of it (brain). (Compare with non-monotonic logic.)

Notes: This article is presented mostly in terms of the Active Perception Theory.

Other contemporary theories are rather functional aspects of the Active Perception Theory.

Figures presented in the article are averages. The ranges of figures are used only when additional clarity is required.

Word “see” is used as a metaphor for perception.

.....

(Lead text)

Perception, as recognition, occurs when our sensations match expected sensations (default percepts) based upon our, also expected, description. This process is nonconscious and rather fast; two milliseconds in average. This speed can be experienced when we look at an ambiguous image with an assumed (default) percept; it seems that we recognised an image as soon we laid our eyes at it.

However, if our expectations are not met, the unexpected attracts our attention and we became conscious of it within half a second. At the same time our nonconscious cognition is trying to build up and verify a new expected description out of cognitive elements or percepts. This delay can be experienced when we try to see un-assumed images in a set of stimuli that form an ambiguous image. The delay usually lasts at least half a second. The length of the delay strongly depends on how familiar we are with all ambiguities the set of stimuli can have. If somebody just surprised us, for example, with information about another possible interpretation, we may need to invest much more effort to actually see the alternative - and this takes time...

It is also important to clarify the word “description” as a core concept used to describe how we see. At any point in time, we describe what we expect to see on the basis of past experiences. At any point of time, for example, we build a description in advance for what we are about to see as we turn around “that corner”. And when we do turn around that corner, specific expectations for bakery, for example, will be quickly confirmed. However, if we do not have previous experiences of environment expected around “that corner”, we have to build up the picture we see from its elements turning vague expectations into more specific. And if we moved into a suburb of another city for example, weeks, months and even years could pass until we build sufficiently detailed mental maps for what is around “that corner”...

Cognitive perception is extensively researched by cognitive psychologists. At the beginning their research was centred on ambiguous sensations and crowned by seminal works of Richard L. Gregory. This research was, however, hugely augmented by new technologies and skills that enabled mapping subjective experiences with recorded activities within our brain. Understanding perception is a key to understanding a well measured phenomenon - phenomenon psychologists call consciousness. From psychological perspective, consciousness is like a spotlight that casts light at very few “items” in the dark see of nonconsciousness; seven symbols in average. Another set of measurements performed by Benjamin Libet gave us a moment when we decide to act or veto an action. And this was a big surprise. It turned out that brain activity for an action starts well before we detect consciously an urge to act - half a second earlier. Here however, we are talking about habitual acts or perceptions based upon our previous experiences. As on unknown territory, acts that are not in our habitual repertoire are performed hesitantly with half a second delayed disruptions; very much like when we learn a new dance.

It should be noted, though, that philosophers use term consciousness for another phenomenon that is here referred to as phenomenal consciousness. Psychological consciousness can be derived from phenomenal consciousness. And the phenomenal consciousness must be in this case assumed as given - primary. And this primacy of phenomenal consciousness prevents us from deriving conclusions about it from finds in cognitive psychology about our perception and consciousness.

The Three Corners of Perception

The developmental psychology established the three corners of perception: genome, culture and personal experiences. Through genome we inherit parts of vague expectations that are later complemented as we grow into our culture. At the same time we start to refine these, inherited but vague, expectations through our own, personal experiences.

This view is now receiving increased support from genetics and anthropology. Several studies showed differences in genome and epigenome on the basis of accumulated experiences of our parents and our own accumulated experiences as we live within our culture. Anthropological studies in perceptual differences between cultures, now facilitated by brain scanning equipment, have also provided strong support.

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Your comments please:

(Thank you.)

File:Wyoplate2009.jpg

WY license plate

Damir Ibrisimovic, I can corroborate the first 2 paragraphs above: when growing up in El Paso, Texas we had the opportunity to see the first license plates with pictures in the Western US, from Wyoming. The picture on the license place featured a cowboy on a bucking bronco and the dramatic silhouette remains in my mind as a vivid first impression (when first introduced, the background was a plain solid beige, I believe, and the silhouette was on the left side of the plate). But now that I live in Wisconsin, I often see the Endangered Species license plate with a wolf's head on it on the left side of the plate. Since my first impression of a license plate with a picture on it was the bucking bronco, as I gaze at the WI license plate, my mind's eye shifts from the bronco to the wolf's head, and the times required to perceive the wolf are as you describe. And yes, the wolf's head and the bucking bronco are of similar dimension and shape on the license plate. Perhaps these two illustrations will help the article -- but as I re-examine this, it is an advantage to show only the first image (to simulate the first impression which somehow remains vivid in memory, for me) and to force people to retrieve the next images (to simulate the re-construction process, which somehow is less vivid than the first impression, for me).

I have often wondered why no one ever mentioned this in the encyclopedia before; my own father-in-law once described the process of looking at a yard sign which at first impression morphed from one shape to another shape as he got a better look. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 22:43, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

This gives me the opportunity to reconstruct what must be happening as I parse the events which make up my driving experience:

1. In car, driving.
2. Car in front of me is close enough for me to see the license plate.
3. License plate is in its usual spot on the car.
4. License plate has picture on it (fairly unusual as most plates just have letters and numbers - and yes, I am aware that a Wisconsin car's license plate has a small barn, a small sun, and a small sailboat on it - but that is routine and those small pictures can be ignored, as they are a quarter or a sixth of the area of the protrait of the wolf's head).
5. I remember the license plate archetype (in your terminology: default percept) which I have learned decades before (bucking bronco) in my mind's eye.
6. I double-check the picture by zooming in on the wolf position (in your terminology: nonconscious cognition is trying to build up and verify a new expected description out of cognitive elements or percepts) on the plate. -- What some people describe as "it leapt out at me".
7. Yes, it's the wolf (and yes I am aware that sometimes the picture is a fireman's seal or some university campus seal, or a purple heart medal etc. - but the shapes of those pictures is completely different from the wolf - and yes Wisconsin has an inordinate number of these specialized plates) (in your terminology: our description (brain)).
8. Attention returns to more urgent events.

Sounds like situated cognition, doesn't it. These events are happening for me at an intuitive rate which is God-given, too fast for me to have described on my own. Because you have described them abstractly as you have, above, I can understand your article because that is what is happening for me, concretely, and not abstractly.

Your rewrite is in fact superior to the current state of the article, of course. But what about the poor guy for whom the rewrite is just words? He might not understand it because he doesn't have the background. Would it help if you used the experience I described above as a concrete example? --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:19, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

Of course, there are any number of exemplars which you might use to make the rewrite more real for the reader. Some that come to mind are movies, job interviews, cultural stereotypes, political campaigns, workplace interactions, marriages, parent-child interactions, etc. --Ancheta Wis (talk) 02:19, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

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Dear Ancheta,

I have a lot of examples, but I am not so sure how familiar they could be to other people. I am grateful therefore for your and others might have. Together we could work out the best for the article.

All of us here have some strong points in our own areas of expertise. And practically all of us could have a meaningful contribution to the article on perception from a variety of perspectives. This is why I “advertised” the rewriting of this article all over the place.

I also share your sentiment (“why no one ever mentioned this in the encyclopedia before”). And I can explain this. There are simply people who think that they understand something after reading few books on the topic. Unfortunately a kind of egalitarianism brought this here to an extreme. And practically any small ego can bully you. And I had enough of that...

I certainly hope to gather others like you here and start doing the job properly. Egalitarianism yes, but not unsubstantiated or on technicalities.

Kind regards, Damir Ibrisimovic (talk) 07:40, 8 February 2010 (UTC)

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Other comments please: